This somewhat lengthy essay is a response to an article by Rev. Anthony Cekada (+2020). He was a sedevacantist priest who also rejected the validity of the Second Vatican Council. In 2006 he wrote an article (which is still available online) that rejected the validity of episcopal ordinations using the reformed ritual promulgated under Pope Saint Paul VI.

This is not normally the kind of topic which I would address as I am not a controversialist; however, some have found the writings of Rev. Cekada (hereafter Rev. C. for brevity as I will be referring to him quite often) and this has caused them to doubt the validity of the current Roman Catholic bishops and in turn the validity of the current Roman Catholic priests. And so, for the good of the faithful I have decided to set down my thoughts to be of aid to those that might accidentally be led astray by his works. To address his thought, I will outline the relevant works by Rev. C., then I will lay out some high-level principles relevant to our discussion, and finally I will move work by work in chronological order examining and commenting upon his arguments.

Rev. C.’s first public article on this topic is Absolutely Null and Utterly Void: The 1968 Rite of Episcopal Consecration published on March 25, 2006.¹ The title of this article is a reference to the apostolic letter Apostolicae Curae by Pope Leo XIII from 1896 which declared that the Anglican ordinations where “absolutely null and utterly void.”² As so unsurprisingly, in this article Rev. C. finds the current rite of episcopal ordination also invalid.

Almost a year later, on January 9, 2007, he published a follow up article entitled The 1968 Rite of Episcopal Consecration: Still Null and Still Void Replies to objections from Br. Ansgar Santogrossi, Fr. Pierre-Marie de Kergorlay and Fr. Alvaro Calderon in response to three responses to his 2006 article.³ Unfortunately the responses to the original 2006 article are not easily accessible. Needless to say, they did not change his mind. A few months later he returned to the topic again in May 2007 with an article entitled New bishops, Empty Tabernacle responding the SSPX in France who had defended the current ritual.⁴ He returned to the topic one final time on June 21, 2012, in a post on his own website entitled Saved by Context? The ‘68 Rite of Episcopal Consecration where he responded to a person who sees the validity of the current rite based upon the full context of the Prayer of Ordination.⁵

Initial Observations

Having sketched out the documentary timeline, I would like to make some initial observations. First, for such a major thesis, the brevity of Rev. C.’s original article is shocking. Apparently, such a major error has been missed for decades that he can in a mere fourteen pages definitively show that the ordination rite is invalid. One would expect this to take at least the length of a book to properly address. As a result, there are hidden erroneous presuppositions that Rev. C. does not spell out and which I will endeavor to lay plain. This though also means that I will have to go into further details than might otherwise be necessary. But when the Devil is in the details, the light must be brought there.

Looking at his presuppositions, two stem from the very facts of his sedevacantist position and his rejection of the Second Vatican Council. These a priori propositions are assumed in much of his argumentation, and if one were to reject these presuppositions then his argumentation also fails. I will point out when this is the case. That is, if one accepts that the Bishop of Roman is in fact the Pope, and that the Second Vatican Council was in fact an ecumenical council of the Catholic Church, then his argumentation becomes far weaker. This logical error is called question begging.

Further, he does not properly address who is competent in judging these matters. Only the Church and the Pope in particular is capable of passing a definitive judgement on the validity of sacramental form. Yes, theologians can provide opinions. Yes, they can even find clear cases of invalidity. But when there is doubt on the matter of validity, meaning there can be reasonable argumentation both ways as to if a sacramental form is valid, then only the Magisterium has competency to judge on the matter. And conveniently for Rev. C., he rejects the very Magisterium which approved the current rite of ordination. Not just conveniently, but his rejection is precisely because he disagrees with Paul VI’s promulgation of the current rite of ordination. For him, the promulgation of the current rite of ordination was promulgation of heresy (since it supposedly does not have a valid form) and in doing so Paul VI automatically ceased to be Pope. Now it is hard to tell which came first for Rev. C., his sedevacantism, which led to him finding Paul VI’s promulgation as the convenient justification of his sedevacantism, or if he first thought that Paul VI promulgated an invalid rite of ordination which in turn led to Rev. C. being a sedevacantist.

For one who is in communion with Rome and believes that the Pope is in fact the Pope, then they can confidently trust that whatever ambiguities there may be in the text, the Pope correctly spoke on the validity of the rite of ordination. (There is a school of thought that such decisions must be infallible by the Pope because they address matters so essential to the faith.)

The Original Article from 2006

To comment on Rev. C.’s articles I will move through them section by section and comment upon them as needed. I will cite them in-line by page numbers for the sake of convenience. Rev. C. begins with an overview of the literature within the “traditionalist” school that argued for the invalidity of sacraments as a result of the liturgical reforms starting in the 1960s. I will assume that the history of his own school of thought is correct. It is interesting to note that he places the source waters of this history with a work entitled Questioning the Validity of Masses using the All-English Canon by Patrick Omlor from 1967. The very notion that changing between languages can invalidate a sacramental form is at first glance absurd. For if that was the case, one should be really worried that Christ himself did not speak Latin at the Last Supper, and that the Greek Words of Consecration recorded in the New Testament accounts are themselves a translation from either the Aramaic or Hebrew which Christ himself would have spoken during the meal. Now Rev. C. does not himself endorse this position, but it does alert us that we need to be careful of sloppy scholarship.

Of the history that he outlines, only those who are part of the SSPX and related organizations had serious concerns over the validity of ordinations. He does not clearly say why they had concerns but simply notes that the rite had changed and that concerned them. Yes, he mentioned a book-length treatment in 2005 which concluded that the current rite is invalid, but he does not provide a reason why this may be the case nor does he provide a summary of the book’s argumentation.⁶ In time it would appear the SSPX came to terms with the validity since the current rite has “DNA” from Eastern rites of ordination (namely Coptics and Maronites). (pg. 2) This argument for validity comes from an article by SSPX priest Fr. Pierre-Marie in 2005.⁷ And so most properly, Rev. C.’s article is responding to Fr. Pierre-Marie’s article, not the broader Catholic theological world. (This is a result of his having already discredited the contemporary Catholic scholarship.) For this reason, he is more concerned with showing that the Eastern rite of ordination claim is weak. To do so Rev. C. will attempt to answer two central questions:

(1) What principles does Catholic theology employ to determine whether a sacramental form is valid or invalid?

(2) How do those principles apply to the new rite of episcopal consecration? (pg. 2)

This happily gives us a clear framework to judge his claims and see if he has been successful. And it gives us a benchmark to attempt to put forth a response to him.

I. Principles to Apply (pgs. 2-4)

This section seeks to address his first question indicated above: what principles are used to determine validity of a sacrament? His explanation of sacrament form, omitting the form, changes in the form, and using an eastern rite form are all fair enough. (pgs. 2-3) His fifth section “E. Requirements in a Form for Holy Orders” requires a closer look because this will set the core principle for all that follows. He rightly cites the Apostolic Constitution Sacramentum Ordinis by Pius XII which states that “the only form, is the words which determine the application of this matter, which univocally signify the sacramental effects – namely the power of Order and the grace of the Holy Spirit – and which are accepted and used by the Church in that sense.”⁸

He rightly identifies that Pius XII indicates two criteria:

1. The words used must “univocally signify the sacramental effects” meaning they must clearly and unambiguously signify (indicated or express) the sacrament effect of the specific order;

2. And that this effect comes about by grace of the Holy Spirit.

He though does not explicitly mention two more criteria that I would include:

1. The form must be accepted and used by the Church;

2. And understood by the Church as signifying that effect.

These last two criteria are important because language can mean many things and context determines what a text means. By that, I mean context actually constitutes text as a text. Without context language is largely (if not entirely) incomprehensible. The phrase “rite of ordination” signifies one thing to a Catholic and another to a Buddhist monk. This is why we look to the Church to see if she accepts a form or not, because we are looking to the Magisterium to see how she understands the words. The Church herself supplies a context which is necessary to properly understand that text. If the Church understands the words to signify the effect of the sacrament and she has formally expressed so, then one must have an incredibly strong argument to show that the Church does not in fact know what she is saying. That is unless you a priori reject the Magisterium of the Church.

Continuing to the next section “F. Episcopal Consecration in Particular” Rev. C. notes that Pius XII identified the form of episcopal consecration as “Complete in thy priest the fullness of Thy ministry, and adorned in the raiment of all glory, sanctify him with the dew of heavenly anointing.” (pg. 4)⁹ He will then claim that this form fulfills the above-mentioned criteria in the following ways:

(1) “The fullness of Thy ministry,” “raiment of all glory” = power of the Order of episcopacy.

(2) “The dew of heavenly anointing” = grace of the Holy Ghost. (pg. 4, emphasis in original)

Unfortunately, he does not explain just how (1) univocally shows the power of the Order of Episcopacy. It would appear that from (1) that the core of the episcopacy is sharing in a fullness of Christ’s ministry and being clothing in God’s glory. Interestingly he misses another essential character of the sacrament in the form “complete in thy priest the fullness of Thy ministry,” meaning this sacrament is completing or fulfilling the priestly character receiving in ordination to the Priesthood. And so, we can summarize three characteristics of the order of episcopacy:

1. It completes priesthood,

2. It is the fullness of Christ’s ministry,

3. And it endows the person with divine glory.

(2) is fine, no reasonable mind would argue it is not referring to the Holy Spirit.

II. Origin of the New Rite (pg. 4)

This section is broadly correct in that Bernard Botte was the chief drafter of the reformed rite and used Syriac and Coptic rituals for his proposed reform. Unsurprisingly Rev. C. is quite polemical and unobjective in his interpretation of the history. We will return to Rev. C.’s opinion on Botte in his second article, since they become more relevant there.

III. The Paul VI Form (pg. 4)

This section is so short, and yet probably the most important one in the whole article. This is where Rev. C. ought to have spent considerable space analyzing the form to set up the field of play. For the sake of the reader, I have updated the English translation of the form to the current version and not used Rev. C.’s version; this does not affect anything in the argument.

After providing the current form, Rev. C. gives his assessment of the form, “at first glance, it does seem to mention the Holy Ghost. However, it does not appear to specify the power of Holy Order being conferred — the fullness of the priesthood that constitutes the episcopacy — that the traditional form so clearly expressed.” (pg. 4) (Note that he now adds the character of completing priesthood which he did not earlier.) Yet, what is his argument for this case? His whole thesis is predicated upon this single sentence being true and yet he does not provide a single reason to doubt the validity of this form. (Unless of course you already doubt the Second Vatican Council and its products. Yes, I will keep hammering this point home. Doubt and suspicion of Holy Mother Church is a product of the very modernism that our dear author supposes to fight against. Doubt is also the first tool of the Devil starting in the Garden of Eden.)

Further he claims that he will “proceed from stronger arguments for validity to weaker ones” (pg. 4) without starting with any basic analysis of the text which would be the strongest argument by his own criteria which only pertain to qualities of the text itself. Yes, Pius XII refers to Church usage, but our author does not, and so it is quite surprising that instead of going directly to the text and applying his criteria, he begins with looking at ecclesial usage, which is the weaker argument.

And so, I will provide what Rev. C. does not, an analysis of the form so we can see if there are any grounds for suspicion. The core of the discussion around the current text is this governing Spirit which was given by God the Father to his beloved Son, which in turn Christ gave to his Apostles, who in turn established the Church. That is, what is given is a governing Spirit from God the Father. This Spirit is then described with two subordinate clauses: “whom you gave to your beloved Son Jesus Christ” and “whom he gave to the holy Apostles.” As such the textual context of this primary gift indicates that this governing Spirit is that which was given to Christ and that which was given to the Apostles. Finally, the second subordinate clause has its own subordinate clause: “who [the Apostles] established the Church in each place as your sanctuary, to the glory and unfailing praise of your name,” which further contextualizes the meaning of the gift of the Spirit to the Apostles. With this in mind, let us look at each of the four parts in order.

Now pour forth upon this chosen one the power that is from you [God the Father], the governing (principalem) Spirit,

This phrase is where all the debate occurs. Rev. C. will claim that the phrase “governing Spirit” in particular does not indicate the power of the order of bishops, and we will look at that claim more closely. But first we have to look earlier in the opening phrase, since another claim of those who deny validity is that just the Holy Spirit is being given; and many sacraments give the Holy Spirit (e.g., Baptism, and Confirmation); therefore, the phrase “governing Spirit” is not specific enough to signify the order of bishops. Looking earlier in the phrase, it is not simply that the Holy Spirit as a governing Spirit, but the power of the Holy Spirit as a governing Spirit is given. The question then becomes what is the power of the governing Spirit that is pour out, not simply what does governing Spirit indicate in se.

Returning to “governing (principalis) Spirit,” the clearest reading of the Spirit in this phrase is as the Holy Spirit. We will see this more clearly in the following clauses, but we can safely affirm that now. And so, the second criterion for a valid form is satisfied. As Rev. C. will note later there was much discussion over the term principalis after the Council. And so, we will need to spend a little time on this word. Principalis can indicate first in rank or primacy as an adjective, or a source or font, the foremost official, or overseer of lesser officials as a noun.¹⁰ Surveying Patristic Latin texts, the adjectival use is more frequent than the substantive form.

Following Rev. C., this word can be paired with the Greek hegemonia which is a noun and indicates primarily temporal or juridical authority.¹¹ Rev. C. will then go onto to argue that therefore this word cannot possibly indicate the powers of the office of bishop since these powers cannot be merely juridical. (pg. 9) Now hegemonia was in fact used to indicate the juridical extent of a bishop’s authority; however, it could also indicate the governing spirit of a person, and spiritual preeminence.¹² That is, even in Patristic (and Greek philosophical) usage hegemonia does not simply mean juridical authority, but also spiritual powers or faculties.¹³

Further, there is another Greek word that is a synonym to hegemonia: episkopos.¹⁴ Episkopos also originally only meant temporal power in “secular” usage; however, in time it came to refer to bishops in se, meaning both as a sacramental and juridical reality. As such, just because principalis primarily indicated temporal authority or temporal preeminence does not exclude its usage today for spiritual authority or spiritual preeminence. Further as noted, both principalis and hegemonia themselves could be used for spiritual preeminence and spiritual powers or faculties even in the Patristic period.

And so, returning to the semantic domain of principalis itself, it can clearly support the idea of the bishop as the fullness of Holy Orders, particularly when we recall that in some way the lower ranks participate in the episcopal rank, that is the bishop is the source of the other ranks. It can also clearly support the idea of powers or faculties beyond mere juridical realities. Rev. C. will trace the discussion on how to understand principalis and that it came to take on the governing meanings of the word (hence the English translation), and he concludes therefore this must indicate a juridical reality. But as we have seen, the word supports a spiritual (or ontological) notion of governing, since it can denote in Greek thought the governing faculty of the intellect over the body. As such the clean divide between juridical governance and sacramental governance or the power of governance as an ontological reality which Rev. C. wants to make cannot be sustained based upon either the Greek or Latin usage during the Patristic period. Further given our theology of the episcopacy, the bishop’s authority and governance of the diocese is intimately tied together with him as the source of sacred ministry throughout the diocese. And so, with this we can find a path to expressing the powers of the episcopal office.

Further, the Church after the council understands the governing role as unique to the episcopacy and what is uniquely added to Priesthood. (Though this was not a novelty of the council, this was widely held before the council. Aquinas himself presupposes that the office of bishop essentially involves being set over others to govern them.¹⁵) As we will see later, this is not a juridical office, but one which flows from the sacramental character of the bishop. And so, at this point we can say that there are some ambiguities, and if this open phrase was all there was to the text of the form, then there may be a problem. However, there are three more clauses provided to unpack the power of this governing Spirit.

whom you gave to your beloved Son Jesus Christ

Moving to our first subordinate clause, this governing Spirit is identified with the Spirit which was given to Christ. If there was any doubt whether this Spirit was the Holy Spirit, there can be none now as Christ received no Spirit but the Holy Spirit. Further the phrasing of the gift of the Spirit is clearly an allusion to Christ’s baptism where “the Spirit of God descending like a dove and coming upon him. And a voice came from the heavens, saying, ‘This is my beloved Son, with whom I am well pleased.’” (Mt 3:16-17, cf. Mk 1:10-11, Lk 4:22, and Jn 1:32-33. Emphasis added.) Interestingly it is after Christ’s baptism that he goes into the desert to be tempted and then begins his public ministry. And so, Christ’s baptism and the presence of the Holy Spirit is related to the initiation of his public ministry. That is, the fullness of Christ’s ministry began with the gift of this Spirit, and so the power of this same Spirit is given to the person being ordained. This is the second criterion describing the episcopal office.

and whom he gave to the holy Apostles,

Moving on to the second subordinate clause, it is this Spirit which Christ received which the text says was given to the Apostles. This is clearly a reference to Pentecost and the gift of the Holy Spirit by Christ to the Apostles. In the Gospel of John we read, “Jesus said to them again, ‘Peace be with you. As the Father has sent me, so I send you.’ And when he had said this, he breathed on them and said to them, ‘Receive the holy Spirit. Whose sins you forgive are forgiven them, and whose sins you retain are retained.’” (Jn 20:21-23) As noted above, Christ’s public ministry began by the Father sending the Spirt, and so too now the Apostles are gifted the Spirit and sent out in the same way. The Apostles had been ministering alongside Christ previously, but now that have received the fullness of Christ’s ministry in the gift of the power the Spirit (hence why they can now forgive sins which only God can do).

Again, in Acts of the Apostles we read “they were all filled with the holy Spirit and began to speak in different tongues, as the Spirit enabled them to proclaim. … Then Peter stood up with the Eleven, raised his voice, and proclaimed to [the crowd] … Those who accepted his message were baptized, and about three thousand persons were added that day.” (Acts 2:4, 14, and 41) Once more the gift of the Spirit leads the Apostles to public ministry and the celebration of the sacrament of baptism. (Which also come to be the core functions of the Apostles: peaching, and leading prayer or celebrating the sacraments. See Acts 6:2-4) Or to put it another way, the Apostles received the fullness of their office from this Spirit, which in turn is given to the man in ordination.

Further, this same apostolic public ministry will in turn will lead the Apostles to ordaining deacons. And so, this Spirit given to Christ leads him to ordain the Apostles for public ministry, they in turn take on the same public ministry of Christ and in time they will ordain others. And so, by basic logic, if this same Spirit is given to the one being ordained, then he too is being given the power to ordain. Taking all of this together, the power of this Spirit as given to the Apostles fulfills the first criterion of completing priesthood. And here it is worth noting that it is not indicating the completion of priesthood in the sense that the Apostles were priests before Pentecost and then bishops afterward, but in the sense that the episcopacy (and the Apostles) is the fullness itself and the other grades of Holy Orders are only counted in reference to the episcopacy. We can restate the criterion: episcopacy completes priesthood as episcopacy is the fullness of priesthood.

who established (constituerunt) the Church in each place as your sanctuary(sanctuarium), to the glory and unfailing praise of your name.

Coming to the final subordinate clause, this one adds context to how we are to understand the role of the Apostles. This clause is tricky to unpack because of how the different concepts grammatically relate to each other. The simple read is that the person receives the power to establish churches in different place, in the sense of establishing Local Churches (i.e., dioceses or eparchies). Rev. C. will rightly note in his second article that this power is proper to the Pope alone and was unique to the Apostles.¹⁶ As such, this interpretation does not help us.

Happily, the text need not be interpreted in that way, and it would also seem to not mean it anyway. The text says that the (One) Church is established in each place as a sanctuary, meaning the one Church of God becomes establishes or planted in every place as God’s sanctuary. Meaning, the mode by which the Church is established is through establishing it as God’s sanctuary in specific places throughout the world. And so, the question then becomes what is this sanctuary and how does that happen? The clause finishes by specifying that this sanctuary renders glory and unfailing praise to God’s name. How does that happen other than through the worship of God in truth and spirit? It is through the establishment of the sacraments and preeminently the celebration of the Eucharist that the Church is establish in local places as a sanctuary of God or holy place of God. The clause is not concerned with the establishment of Local Churches, but the establishing of the Church’s worship so as to render glory and praise to God. And how can the bishop do so unless he has the ability to ordain priests to celebrate the sacraments? And here this would satisfy the first two criteria required for a valid form.

And so, we can summarize this close reading of the entire text of the form by saying the Holy Spirit gives the man the power to exercise Christ’s own public ministry and the public ministry of the Apostles. If that is not what the character of a bishop is I have no idea what a bishop is. The bishops are the successor of the Apostles, and so if praying for the man to receive the power of their ministry does not express that reality I do not know how to do so. Further to deny so would require one to deny that the Apostles themselves were bishops, in which case one might have just found themselves in friendship with the Reformers (… of the 1500s). Rev. C. would probably object that if we have to do this much work, then it is not clear. The problem is that the same amount of work must be done to make clear the older form too. This will be a problem for Rev. C. later, as the level of clarity which he expects from the current form when applied to the previous form, results in one having to doubt that the old form itself was valid. More on that later.

An objection might be raised at this point: the form does not mention the person himself receiving the fullness of glory. It is dubious that this is strictly necessary, as the old form seems to have “all glory” modify the kind of raiment bestowed to clarify which raiment is given. That is “all glory” is accidental and the raiment could be described in other ways. Nevertheless, “all glory” inhering in the man is not explicit in the current text, yet it is hard to imagine one not receiving divine glory if they are receiving the same office as the Apostles and the same Spirit given to Christ.

And so, it appears that we have no positive reason on the face of the text alone to doubt the validity of this sacramental form. It meets the requirements that Rev. C. himself identified earlier. This argument does not require one to assent to the Second Vatican Council or that the Pope is in fact the Pope. It works entirely using presumptions Rev. C. (and traditionalist like him) should accept and so does not beg the question against him. Therefore, by all right I can stop right here; he has provided no reason to doubt this text thus far and I have met the criteria which he has stipulated. But naturally, that is not what we are going to do since he does attempt to respond to some of the above. And so let us continue along with the article.

IV. An Eastern Rite Form? (pgs. 4-7)

This section opens once more with the question begging problem. Rev. C. again cites Sacramentum Ordinis that the words of ordination must be “accepted and used by the Church in that sense.” And if the Church after the council accepted the form (by Papal decree and the ordinary magisterium of the College of Bishops), the words are able to clearly articulate the effect of the sacrament (as above noted), and the Church uses them in that way, then there is no problem. However, since Rev. C. rejects the living Magisterium of the Church, he in turn rejects that the Church has accepted the form and so begs the question.

Further, since Rev. C.’s primary focus is Fr. Pierre-Marie’s argument, which as presented by Rev. C. depends primarily upon the antiquity of the reformed form, his opening remarks in this section are unproductive for his argumentation as we are concerned with his argument. Yes, his argument might respond to the SSPX, but it is not a problem for the rest of Catholic theologians. It is openly accepted that the reformed liturgical texts are inspired by parts of ancient liturgical texts, while no serious academic would say they are identical to the ancient texts.

Turning to his discussion on the Coptic rite of ordination, I do not have ready access to the basic Coptic text from which he is working; nevertheless, we can make some observations based upon what he provides. He acknowledges that “the Paul VI Preface surrounding the new form contains many phrases found in the Coptic form,” (pg. 5) and then says that “these phrases are missing.” (pg. 5, emphasis in original) by which he means “to provide clergy according to His commandment for the priesthood… to make new houses of prayer, and to consecrate altars.” However, just because they are part of the “form” in the Coptic rite of ordination, that does not mean they are essential for the form of the sacrament; after all, the pre-conciliar form makes no mention of these things either and that was valid. And so just because they are not present is not itself a problem.

Moving on to his section on the Maronite rite of ordination, he is correct that the prayer does not clearly come from the Maronites. Interestingly, Rev. C. does seem to like that they mention the reception of the “sublime episcopal order” in their prayer of ordination; however, it must be noted that naming the thing does not itself describe or signify the thing unless you already know what the episcopal order is. (pg. 6) Meaning, external theological context and knowledge of the intention of the Church is necessary to have a clear understanding of what is signified. Which is of course how text works; however, if that is the case and if this formula works for them, then why does receiving the Spirit Christ gave to the holy Apostles not work for us now? How can he possibly go on to so stridently reject context when this citation only works by context?

Next comes the Syrian rite of ordination. There is not much to add in commentary beyond what I have noted for the Coptic and Maronite sections. He then ends with the section, “D. Not an Eastern Form.” As already mentioned, the claim that the current form is not an exact eastern text is not controversial unless you are part of the SSPX apparently. At this point what is interesting is that he has not just gone to Bernard Botte’s text and looked at the sources that he used, that would have saved him a lot of investigative work.

V. Another Approved Form? (pgs. 7-8)

Mercifully, this section is shorter though still caught up on the antiquity of the text. It is accepted that the text is inspired by ancient texts not literally an ancient text. Looking at his section on the Apostolic Tradition of Hippolytus, he is broadly right that this text is quite complicated and hard to derive definitive conclusions concerning liturgical practices in the third century. At a minimum it can give us a feel for how things were understood and maybe no more than that. This holds true for the other documents which he looks at and so his conclusions at the end are broadly correct. (pg. 8)

VI. Power of the Episcopacy? (pgs. 8-11)

Finally, we arrive at the arguments that truly matter to us. In these pages Rev. C. engages with the text itself. And at the start he opens with a bit of sophistry by stating “Lutheran, Methodist and Mormon bishops also govern” and so it seems ambiguous to state that “governing Spirit” in the current form speaks to episcopal governance. (pg. 8) But just because the dictionary has multiple meanings for a word does not mean every time we use the word the meaning is ambiguous. Nor because others might use a word incorrectly does not mean the word is ambiguous.

And this brings us to the core issue with his hermeneutics (method of interpretation). Rev. C. seems to think that the only way a sacramental form can be clear and unambiguous is if there are no competing interpretations of the form. (cf. pg. 10) Further his analysis lacks awareness of the entire form itself focusing only on two words “governing Spirit”. Yet as we have already seen above in detail, the two subordinate clauses further clarify what is meant by this governing Spirit.

He claims that the term phrase “governing Spirit” cannot indicate the power of bishop in theory. (pg. 10) But as our fuller analysis has shown, Rev. C. is simply wrong on this case. Further his analysis is entirely dependent upon the text in the light of ancient sources and how they mean a governing Spirit. (pgs. 9-10) However, he had already discounted the text as coming from those same sources and so therefore it is not our concern how those texts meant the phrase. He cannot have it both ways. He cannot say this text did not come from source A, therefore the form is not ancient and so invalid; and that source A uses governing Spirit in a not sacramental way, therefore the form is not valid.

Now yes, we care about the broad semantic domain of principalis as we already saw. But Rev. C.’s argument is 1) that this is a new text and so cannot be argued to be valid from past validity, and 2) the text itself cannot meet the criteria for validity. Once we accept number 1, that also frees us to use a different part of the semantic domain for the word principalis in interpreting the text than people 1700 years ago would have. But even still, as we saw earlier, the current usage of the word prinicipalis is not novel or a fringe meaning.

Now if we apply this same logic of clarity applied by Rev. C. to the old form what happens?

Complete in thy priest the fullness of Thy ministry, and adorned in the raiment of all glory, sanctify him with the dew of heavenly anointing.

What is this fullness of Christ’s ministry? Well ministry (diakonia in Greek) could be either diaconal or episcopal. Christ himself came to serve and not to be served,¹⁷ and so emptied himself taking the form of a slave.¹⁸ So maybe the fullness of Christ’s ministry is a fuller form of diaconal ministry. (Rev. C. will be really strict that no further context can be taken and to be clear there can be only one meaning.) Or we could also argue that Christ was a king in his ministry, so maybe this means the priest is receiving Christ’s royal ministry since he already shares in Christ’s priestly and diaconal ministry. There seems to be plenty of ambiguity and so reason to doubt the validity.

Of course, this line of argumentation is absurd. The form can indicate the office of the episcopacy. However, it can only do so if you already know what a bishop is. After all it mentions nothing about ordinations, it mentions nothing about governance of a diocese; in fact, it mentions nothing about the character of Christ’s ministry and what a full share in that ministry looks like. And yet, it is clearly understood. If we permit the same knowledge of a bishop as necessary context to understand the sacramental form, the above discussion should be sufficient to demonstrate that the current form is at least as clear as the previous form.

The Final Sections (pgs. 11-14)

Rev. C. naturally concludes that there is a substantial change and so the current rite of episcopal ordination is invalid. (pg. 11) He entertains the objection that the context can help clarify the meaning, only to dismiss it without even entertaining the context of the form itself in the subordinate clauses. He once more mentions the lack of clear reference to the ability to ordain in the form itself and yet the previous version also had no reference. (pg. 12)

Still Null and Still Void: Attempted Response

As mentioned earlier, this article is in response to three critics of his first article which we just looked at. His opening summary of his position is largely the same except he clarifies how he understands Pius XII’s use of “univocal”: “The term governing Spirit, then, is not univocal, a term that signifies only one thing, as Pius XII required. Rather, it is ambiguous — capable of signifying many different things, qualities and persons.” (pg. 3, emphasis in the original) This usage of univocal is closer to the Aristotelian meaning of the word. It is ambiguous if Pius XII meant this strict meaning of the word. Either way any Thomist or Aristotelian would know that to use a word univocally requires first specifying the proper meaning of the word. This is another way of saying one must define the context of a word. By a strict univocal criterion, the old form fails alongside the current form. As such it would seem that Pius XII does not mean “univocal” in a strict logical sense.

II. Br. Ansgar Santogrossi OSB (pgs. 4-5)

The first critic that Rev. C. responds to is Br. Ansgar (Br. A. hereafter) from Mt. Angel Abbey. Br. A. appears to have taken a similar strategy as I have by acknowledging the semantic domain of words. The core of Rev. C.’s response is that even acknowledging this, the domain is not able to articulate the office of the episcopacy. Br. A. also had the similar objection that by Rev. C.’s own criteria the old form was invalid or at least ambiguous. In particular Br. A. pointed out that the word ministry is ambiguous as it could refer to episcopal or diaconal ministry as such the text itself is not clear in which office in indicated.

Rev. C. claims to erase the ambiguity of the old form by pointing to what the drafter of Sacramentum Ordinis (Rev. Francis Hürth, SJ) intended (namely episcopal ministry). (pg. 4) But it does not really matter what Hürth thought in and of itself; it matters that Pius XII approved of what Hürth thought. Since Pius XII implicitly approved of the selected meaning by Hürth to clarify the ambiguity, then there is in fact no ambiguity in the text. That is convenient for Rev. C. since he accepts the papacy of Pius XII. But in that case, we are permitted to apply the same solution to the current form; namely, Paul VI approved the text and so therefore he must have thought that the text intended to convey the office of episcopacy. And it is here that Rev. C.’s opinions on Botte in the original article become relevant.¹⁹ Rev. C. is of the opinion that Botte himself is not clear that the text of the current form clearly means the episcopacy. And so, the ambiguities of the text cannot be clarified by looking to what Botte thought, whereas the ambiguities for the old form can be clarified by looking to what Hürth thought.

In case it is not obvious, Hürth did not author the old form (as it preceded him by centuries); he helped draft Sacramentum Ordinis and wrote a commentary on the Apostolic Constitution. His comments clarifying the meaning of the form come as a theological expert and presumably were given to the pope who in turn accepted them as how he interpreted the text. It does not logically follow therefore that because Botte as a theological expert while drafting the current rite was himself unclear concerning the meaning of the text (according to Rev. C.) that Paul VI was unclear concerning the meaning of the text. At a minimum all that this means is that Paul VI intended the text in a way different from Botte. (Once more assuming we agree with Rev. C.’s interpretation of Botte.) However, in this case, all that we need to demonstrate concerning the text’s validity is that there is a single way that the form can be interpreted so as to express the episcopal office in a straightforward manner, and then we assume that this is similar to what the pope intended. Which I content I have accomplished above.

What is even better for us and our interpretation, Hürth himself used the fuller context of the older form to help clear the ambiguity of the first clause (the meaning of ministry). (pg. 5) Rev. C. approves of this yet still does not seem to understand how that applies to the current form. (pg. 5) He also seems to miss the point of Br. A.’s argumentation. He does not think the old form was invalid, but simply that Rev. C.’s original argumentation invalidates the old form. To correct for this Rev. C. brings in the nuance that Hürth used above for the old form while missing Br. A.’s greater point that the same needs to be done for the current form.

Unfortunately, it does not appear that Br. A (as presented by Rev. C.) used the full context of the form himself but instead only attempted to defend the form based upon the phrase “governing Spirit.” (pg. 5) As such Br. A. does not sufficiently defend his position since there is sufficient ambiguity in “governing Spirit” which requires something more than an analysis of that phrase itself.

III.Fr. Pierre-Marie OP (pgs. 6-8)

Next Rev. C deals with a brief reply from Fr. Pierre-Marie (Fr. P. hereafter) the original person to whom Rev. C. was primarily responding. Fr. P. raised the same point as I did that there was no mention of the power to ordain in the old form. Rev. C. is correct that he did not technically say that it had to be explicitly mentioned; however, that was the critique he made of the current form when compared to the eastern forms. (pg. 6)

Fr. P. brings in the clause on the apostles but argues that this is the power to found churches. As Rev. C. notes, this is technically a juridical act. (pg. 6) But that is why I did not interpret this clause as a juridical establishing of Churches, but as the celebration of sacraments which flows from the power of the office. As such, my argument still stands. The rest of Rev. C.’s response to Fr. P does not affect much of what has already been said.

IV. Fr. Alvaro Calderon SSPX (pgs. 8-9)

The third and final person the Rev. C responds to is Fr. Alvaro Calderon SSPX. This last objection spends much of its time responding to Rev. C.’s dismissal of the antiquity of the current form. As I have not particularly engaged with this line of argumentation, I will leave Rev. C’s response to this reply to the side.

Back at the SSPX

Rev. C. returns again to respond to the SSPX in France who defended the current form. On neither side does it appear that the ball moves forward. Fr. Celier (the author of the French article Rev. C. is responding to) brings up the same arguments others have made and Rev. C. responds in the same way. As such there is no need to spill further ink.

Still Doesn’t Like Context

The context of this post is one who, when reading the form of the current rite in the light of the explanatory section immediately following the words of ordination, has no doubt about the validity of the form itself. To better understand the context which we will be discussing, I think that it makes sense to present the whole Prayer of Ordination with the three sections indicated by name:

Introductory Preface

God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ,
Father of mercies and God of all consolation,
who dwell on high and look upon the lowly,
who know all things before they come to be:
it is you who established order in your Church through your gracious word,
who from the beginning predestined a righteous people born of Abraham,
who instituted rulers and priest
and did not leave your sanctuary without ministry,
who from the beginning of the world
have been pleased to be glorified in those you have chosen:

Words of Ordination or the Form

Now pour forth upon this chosen one
the power that is from you, the governing Spirit, whom you gave
to your beloved Son Jesus Christ
and whom he gave to the holy Apostles,
who established the Church
in each place as your sanctuary,
to the glory and unfailing praise of your name.

Explanatory Exposition

Grant, O Father, the knower of all hearts,
that this your servant whom you have chosen for the Episcopate
may nourish your holy flock
and may without reproach exercise before you the High Priesthood,
serving you night and day;
that he may unceasingly cause your face to shine upon us
and offer the gifts of your holy Church.
Grant that by the strength of the Spirit of the High Priesthood
he may have authority to forgive sins according to your command;
that he may apportion offices according to your precept
and loosen every bond according to the authority you gave the Apostles;
may he be pleasing to you in meekness and purity of heart,
offering a sweet fragrance to you
through your Son Jesus Christ,
through whom glory and power and honor are yours,
with the Holy Spirit in the holy Church
both now and for ever and ever.

All three prayers of ordination follow a similar structure (though obviously the text is particular to the order). And so, a brief explanation of how these three sections interact is needed. The first section: Introductory Preface introduces the particular order that is being given in the light of the Old and New Testaments. In the Introductory Preface for bishops, we see themes of the origins of authority, and the provisioning of governance and worship. In the Old Testament, the origin of something is seen as the most pure and highest form of something. For this reason, the preface mentions Abraham, who is the origin of all Israel, and so in turn is the fullness of Israel. It is from him that priests and rulers will be provided, not juridically but essentially. This neatly points to the relationship between the bishop and the rest of Holy Orders; he is the origin of priests and deacons not juridically but essentially.

Then come the Words of Ordination themselves. We have discussed them already, and they are what confer the sacrament of ordination itself. Following the Words of Ordination is the Explanatory Exposition. This lengthy section then explains what it is that just happened in the Words of Ordination. And so, we see that the person was chosen for the Episcopate, is a High Priest, can apportion offices, and can loosen every bond according to the authority you gave the Apostles. These are clear indications that the Church intended the Words of Ordination to confer the episcopacy upon the person. And it is this broader context that the person who occasioned the blog post is talking about, and it is this context which Rev. C. discusses in his post.

I. Overthrowing a General Principle

Rev. C. rejects that the broader context of the Prayer of Ordination can salvage an insufficient sacrament form. He states correctly that if the entire rite is done correctly but the form itself is substantially defective (or absent) then the sacrament has not happened. He uses the example of Penance, where only the final sentence “I absolve you…” in the prayer of absolution is necessary. And it is certainly true that if the preceding sentences in the prayer of absolution were said and the final sentence was not, absolution did not happen. And so, context cannot make complete that which is essentially or substantially incomplete.

II. A Missing Element

He continues on to entertain the hypothetical that the Explanatory Exposition could clarify what the words in the form meant. His core contention is that the form only mentions the Holy Spirit, but nothing in the form can reference the order of bishops. Therefore, there is nothing to clarify. And if that were true, then he would be correct. But this seems to imply that if there were elements in form which could signify the episcopal order, then he would entertain the idea that the Explanatory Exposition could provide the needed clarity.

Now, Rev. C. seems to have never moved beyond an analysis of the phrase “governing Spirit” because if he did, as we have mentioned abundantly above, there are certainly ways to see the form mentioning the episcopacy and its powers. After all, the text clearly states that the person is not simply receiving the Holy Spirit, but the power of the Holy Spirit. What kind of power? The power of Christ and the Apostles. One could ask, but what does the Church mean when she says that? Happily, she tells us what she meant by that, it is laid out in the Explanatory Exposition.

III. Admission of a Substantial Defect

Rev. C. then moves on to a “gotcha” point: if the Explanatory Exposition is needed, then the form is not clear, therefore it fails the criterion of clarity defined by Pius XII. And if one could only speak of vague power of the Holy Spirit, he would have a point. However, as we have already seen above, given the structure of the clauses and the text used we can express the power of the office of bishop. Can we do so fully? No, that is impossible in a sentence. The old form itself had ambiguity. That is why we have the explanatory section, to unpack that which is present but densely packed. Information density should not be confused with ambiguity.

IV. Equivocal Qualifiers

Unsurprisingly Rev. C. also takes issue with the descriptions of the episcopacy in the explanatory. He interprets them in a purely juridical sense. And because he can interpret them in a purely juridical sense therefore that are not clearly about the sacrament of orders. Here we run into a major theological question which takes us far beyond the scope of this essay. Namely, whence flows the bishop’s authority? From the law (i.e., from delegation by the Pope) or from the sacrament of episcopal orders? There is a strain of theology running from the early Church up to the Second Vatican Council that the bishop was simply a priest who received juridical authority from the Pope. This is what made him a bishop. As such, all bishops were vicars of the Pope acting in the person of the Pope in the same way that parish priests are acting in the person of their bishop.

There was another strain of theology which ran parallel to this first stain which stated that the bishop’s authority comes from the sacrament itself, meaning from the effect of the man being conformed to Christ the High Priest in a particular way. This effect did not simply unlock that which was laten in the priest but actually perfects the sacrament of Holy Orders and brings about new abilities in the person. As such the bishop’s authority comes directly from Christ through his sacramental configuration to Christ, not from the Pope. Yes, the bishop is juridically bound to the obey the Pope, but his authority does not come from the Pope.

The Second Vatican Council came down firmly on the side of the second strain. In Lumen Gentium we read, “the Sacred Council teaches that by Episcopal consecration the fullness of the sacrament of Orders is conferred, that fullness of power … [which] is called the high priesthood, the supreme power of the sacred ministry.” (LG 21) And so the ordination itself confers the fullness of power, which the Council call the high priesthood. Continuing “episcopal consecration, together with the office of sanctifying, also confers the office of teaching and of governing.” (LG 21) These offices therefore do not come from the Pope or a juridical act, but themselves flow from the sacrament itself. To make it quite clear that the bishop acts in the person of Christ, not the Pope, Lumen Gentium goes on to say that the “bishops in an eminent and visible way sustain the roles of Christ Himself as Teacher, Shepherd and High Priest, and that they act in His person.” (LG 21) and “this power, which they personally exercise in Christ’s name, is proper, ordinary and immediate, although its exercise is ultimately regulated by the supreme authority of the Church.” (LG 27) Yes, the Pope has supreme authority; and yes, the Pope can regulate the Church., but the bishop acts directly and personally in Christ and thence flows his authority, not from the Pope.

How is this all relevant? Well, because the following the first strain it is very hard to distinguish between the bishop’s juridical power and sacramental power. As such it would seem that Rev. C. is following this strain and so has a hard time making the distinction. The Council in siding heavily with the second strain, would clearly intend the powers enumerated in the Explanatory Exposition as indicating sacramental powers, which is why the Church put them in a prayer which she intends to confect the sacrament of ordination to the episcopacy. Yes, these sacramental powers confer juridical authority, but that authority flows from the sacrament. Rev. C. is free to reject the Council, but he cannot reject the fact that the Council took one side and that you must interpret the text in the light of that decision as the text comes from the context of the Council.

Looking more closely at his objections, he first objects that specifying this person participates the in High Priesthood does not in fact indicate that a person has been ordained because “Eastern Rite liturgies use similar language in non-sacramental rites to ‘consecrate’ a Metropolitan or a Patriarch.” Therefore, the office of High Priest is merely a juridical office not sacramental. It would appear if that were case then Rev. C. has proved too much. Then the only priestly difference between a priest and bishop is merely juridical, that the bishop is the high priest of the diocese is merely a juridical fact, not a sacramental fact. But the tradition consistently speaks of the bishop as the high priest to distinguish him from the priests beneath him. And so just how does Rev. C. propose we indicate that in this sacrament a bishop becomes a high priest in some way, if we cannot say he is now a high priest because the term can also be used in a juridical context? If we left it out, he would complain because there was no mention of the bishop participating in the fullness of orders, and if we insert it, he complains. Further, just because a phrase in one context means one thing, and another in another context does not mean it is ambiguous. Finaly in response to this objection, quite conveniently he ignores the parts the says, “chosen for the Episcopate.” If there was an ambiguity about whether the “High Priesthood” referred to the installation of metropolitan or the ordination of a bishop, looking thirteen words earlier in the same sentence would have clarify that.

Turning to his objections to the “Enumerated Powers” this at heart depends upon the theological understanding of the origin of these powers. Yes, some of these powers may be able to be delegated, but that is not how this ordained person has received them. The person received them through the “the Spirit of the High Priesthood [of Christ].” He received them not through delegation (i.e., a juridical act by Christ or the Church) but through participating in Christ’s own strength, meaning through union with Christ himself. This is not a juridical high priesthood, but a unique participation is Christ’s own high priesthood. Once more, the priest originates in the bishop, not vice versa. If the bishop by the sacrament of episcopal orders did not have these powers, then neither would the priests.

His Concluding Thoughts

Rev. C. continues by arguing the Explanatory Exposition is too implicit and removed clear references to episcopal powers, therefore it cannot supply in theory that which is lacking. He also takes umbrage with the principal consecrator alongside the co-consecrators saying the form and then only the principal consecrator saying the final section. And if the final section was part of the form, then he would be correct. The final section cannot make up what is missing in the form unless it is also part of the form. However, the entire point of the Explanatory Exposition is that it unpacks what was already said. As we noted, we can see the episcopacy in the form, and when the final section is interpreted in the light of the Second Vatican Council it can serve to articulate further what has happened. The co-consecrators do not need to say this section, because it is not part of the form.

Conclusion

On one hand, it is unfortunate that Rev. Anthony Cekada passed away in 2020 at what appears to have been a relatively young age. (I think it was in his 60s.) This essay as a whole then can be of little use to advancing a discussion with him. I do think that I have raised points which he has not properly considered; namely the fuller context of the form itself. I think he was too fixated on the two words “governing Spirit,” which led to an overly restrictive understanding of the form. On the other hand, do I think that I would have changed his opinion? No. As stated at the very beginning, his a priori assumptions required him to hold this hill and die upon it. From this perspective this whole exercise is simply tilting at windmills; a vain debate against a man who cannot respond, and even for those who might, would the discussion really advance?

Nevertheless, the originating motivation was not to change Rev. Cekada’s mind, but to shepherd the sheep of my flock and aid my fellow coworkers in guarding their folds. For Rev. Cekada’s writings are still alive and online, and they are still leading people astray. And it is for them, for you, that I hope I have not labored in vain.

The topic is dense and of the highest stakes. To properly engage one ought to be a specialist (or well read) to be able to properly judge the arguments. However, this discussion has been in the public forum, and as such I have striven to make as plain the varied and subtle arguments at play by both myself and Rev. Cekada. More could certainly be said and further explanations given. As I stated at the beginning, one would want a book to properly address this topic for someone unfamiliar with the field.

The heart of my defense is found in my analysis of the form itself. The heart of Rev. Cekada’s argument was always that this text could not express the power of the episcopacy. Most of his critics seem to not have properly addressed that point but instead too quickly conceded that “governing Spirit” was insufficient and moved on to other arguments. I have attempted to respond squarely to the heart of the matter, and it is there that this essay ultimately should be judged. By the grace of God, might it be found true and of aid to the reader.

Prayer for the repose of the soul of Rev. Anthony Cekada. Pray for myself. Pray for unity in the Church.

Footnotes

On February 26, 2025 the Pew Research Center published the findings of their 2023-24 Religious Landscape Study in their report Decline of Christianity in the U.S. Has Slowed, May Have Leveled Off.¹ (Hereafter I will simply cite this document as the “report.” I will also cite the 2023-2024 Religious Landscape Study by the Pew Research Center simply as the “study.”) Many might have already heard the headline finding: the decline of Christianity has leveled off. Various traditional media groups have reported on this particular finding.² And while it is true that the demographics of Christianity have stabilized, the results of the study have more to say than this simple fact. As several have already commented, the broad religious landscape is anything but stable if even the measure of Christians as a percentage of the American population has stabilized for the time being.

In this essay I will look at some other general findings of the study and then I will look at particular findings that are relevant for pastoral planning concerning the continuation of religious practice by children into adulthood. I will look at the role of religion in the family, the effect of frequency of participation in religious services, and finally the effect of participation in religious education programs. As parishes and ecclesial institutions are growing more strained in their available resources, there is great value in reflecting upon how we can get the most results out of each “unit” of effort put into the process of handing on our religion to the future generations.

But first a word on the report and study itself. The study consists of the data, the questionnaire completed by the participants, and the statistical analysis done by Pew Research. The report is a summary analysis of that information. In this article all the data and statistics are from the study and various quotes come from the report (as indicated by the citations). The report generally makes comparisons between 2007 and 2025 (an 18-year period). I retained this temporal range unless I noted otherwise. The data in this study comes from self-reported answers of adults. And so, the data tells us how Americans understand themselves in relationship to religion. It does not tell us how their views actually relate to the doctrines of a particular religion.

Finally, a note on causation versus correlation. This study does not look for causal relationships, and so the relationships in the reported data are at best correlations. Nevertheless, when (as we will see) there are certain correlations that diverge from the general population correlations that implies there is some causal component in the divergent correlation, otherwise there would be no divergence. What we cannot say is how strong the causal link is, or the direction of causality.

General Results

The study found that there has been a broad leveling out of individuals that identify as Christian. Between 60% and 64% of American adults since 2019 have identified as Christians which is a drop of 14-18% from 78% in 2007/. 40% of American adults belong to one of the Protestant denominations, 19% are Catholic, and the other roughly 3% belong to all other Christian groups. Though our numbers (Catholics) are down since 2007, our share of the population “has been stable since 2014, with only small fluctuations in our [Pew Research] annual surveys.” (Report)

The Catholic Church has a large percentage of immigrants with 29% of her members having been born outside of the country and another 14% who were born in America but have at least one parent who was born outside of America. Therefore, a total of 43% of Catholics in America are either first or second-generation immigrants (compared to just 17% among Protestants). These immigrants have largely supplemented the number of Catholics who are leaving the Church and so contributed to our relative stability as a percentage of population. Bracketing the immigrant inflow, for every one person that joins the Church from another religious group another 8.4 Catholics leave the Church.³ The completed fertility rate (defined in the report as the average number of children ever born to adults ages 40-59) of Catholic’s is 2.2 (which is baseline population replacement rate). These two facts could indicate that without Catholic immigrants over the past decade, we could have already gone off the demographic cliff by this point in time.

This large immigrant presence in the local Church though is not new. We have traditionally been an immigrant community. Many have seen these peoples as the hope which will carry the Church in America forward into the future as they integrate into the broader Church in America. However, “more broadly, the survey finds that the long-term decline in Christianity and growth of the religiously unaffiliated population is evident among immigrants, second-generation respondents … and people whose families have been in the U.S. for three generations or more.” (Report) And so even though these new communities are certainly adding to the life of the Church presently, they are not remaining Catholic, and they quickly follow the demographic trends of all other groups. As such immigration alone cannot fix our forthcoming demographic problems but only delay the problem.

To begin to improve the situation we need to focus on how we can better retain the youth in our communities. Overall, we are still losing the youth; however, we are not losing them more quickly than we were in past generations. To improve our prospects, we will need to begin to gain ground on the cohorts between 18-44 and not simply keep them from getting worse. There are several challenges to this highlighted by the report. The first is that “since 2020, however, our surveys indicate that the religiousness of most birth cohorts has remained relatively stable.” (Report) People are not coming back broadly speaking as they get older. “40% of U.S. adults say they attend religious services less often today than they did as children. Just 5% say they attend religious services more often today than they did as kids. And 32% of U.S. adults say religion is less important to them today than it was to their families when they were growing up.” (Report, emphasis in original) No matter what the conventional wisdom may say, across all generations in America, no generation is increasing in religious practice, and only a small portion of Americans increase their religious practice as they age.⁴

This last fact is particularly problematic since each cohort is less religious than the preceding generation and practiced religion less as a child. Religious practice as a child is the greatest indication for future religious practice. (See further discussion of this below.) Meaning, there is a positive feedback loop creating more irreligiosity in Americans which has been active in every single generation alive. The only exception to generations becoming less religious than previous generations is with the two youngest cohorts (18-24 and 24-34) who both are roughly as religious (or irreligious) as each other.

These two youngest groups sit at 51% and 45% Christian, while the oldest two cohorts sit at 80% and 79%. And so, it is expected that if the youngest cohorts remain stable in their association with Christianity, over the next decades we will begin to decline once more towards the 50% mark.

The second major problem is that those who become a “none” (defined by the report as those with no particular religious affiliation, but different from atheists and agnostics) is more “sticky” than religious affiliation. Stickiness is defined as “the persistence of a high level of religiousness from childhood into adulthood.” (Report) Stickiness “appears to be declining [among religions], while the stickiness of a nonreligious upbringing seems to be increasing.” (Report) To show this the reports states:

among the youngest U.S. adults in the survey (now ages 18 to 24), just 28% of those raised in highly religious homes are, today, highly religious themselves. Meanwhile, 76% of young adults who grew up rarely or never attending services, in families in which religion was unimportant, still say they do not attend religious services and that religion is not important to them. In other words, a highly religious upbringing has been much less persistent (or “sticky”) than a nonreligious upbringing so far in the lifetimes of the youngest U.S. adults. (Report)

This fact alone creates major pressures on the Church since if American Catholics only have 2.2 children and assuming all of those families were “highly religious” (which is not the case), then our retained birth rate is only 0.6, or only one child out of every two families in our parishes today will be highly religious once they grow up.

Here though it is important to note what Americans are “becoming.” In the terms of the study, we are becoming less religious but more spiritual. Categorically this is shown by the increase in the Nones since Americans largely are not becoming atheists (5% today with a 3% growth) nor agnostics (6% today with 4% growth). Nones now make up 19% of America (7% growth).

Further religion in the study largely means institutional religion, since what the study identifies as spiritual beliefs (and which they separate from religious beliefs) are propositions that theologians would call theological or religious. From the report we find:

• 86% believe people have a soul or spirit in addition to their physical body.
• 83% believe in God or a universal spirit.
• 79% believe there is something spiritual beyond the natural world, even if we cannot see it.
• 70% believe in an afterlife (heaven, hell, or both).
• 92% believe one or more of the above.

Technically speaking these are truths pertaining to religion or theology. So, we (Americans) are still a deeply religious people and have a broadly theological and transcendent metaphysical world view. And there is stability across generations and within generations across time in the percentage of those who hold these beliefs. What has happened is the separation of a corporate or communal aspect of religion from these theological realities.

Not only are these beliefs stable, but unlike the positive feedback loop causing irreligiosity, “Americans of all ages are more likely to say their spirituality has grown stronger than to say it has weakened.” (Report) Meaning there is an existing feedback loop leading to stronger spirituality already in effect.

This distinction between institutional religion and what we can call natural religion can be seen in the table below:

Importance of religion in one’s life among U.S. adults. % of U.S. adults who say religion is …

Even though 92% of American hold religious beliefs, only 65% think that there is any importance to (institutional) religion. This is what you would expect to find as the Nones increased and natural religion remained the same. Among Catholics it is better where 82% think that religion is at least Somewhat Important, which given the nature of our religion we would expect our members to see value in institutional religion.

With this overview of the general situation, we will now look at how specific aspects of one's upbringing affect these trends.

Role of Religion in the Family

“The survey shows that Americans' current religious identities, beliefs and practices are strongly linked with their upbringing. People who say they were raised in religious homes are much more likely to be religious as adults.” (Report) This has long been known among sociological studies. And we should expect that, since the family is the primary place in which the handing on (tradere) of values happens. But it is not a one-to-one causal link. Society at large also factors into the values which a person holds. This explains why there is a positive feedback loop producing irreligiosity. Our society has largely abandoned the Judeo-Christian worldview, and so even in a very religious household the children do not persevere in their religious upbringing 100% of the time as we saw early since there is a competing worldview presented by society. Nevertheless, focusing on strengthening families and empowering them to hand on the faith to their children is crucial in the propagation of our religion.

Importance of religion to your family when growing up among U.S. adults% of U.S. adults who say when growing up, religion to their family was …

Happily, among American Catholics 89% said religion was at least somewhat import while growing up. We are doing better in this regard relative to other Christians and society at large. Ideally, we would move more of those in the Somewhat Important category to Very Important. The Somewhat Important group is probably a mixture of Christmas/Easter Catholics, those families that are in religious education but do not regularly go to Mass, and those parishioners that are associated with the parish but one does not see regularly. Finding ways to connect them to the parish and community while also showing how our religion can answer the important questions in life could be useful in moving these families towards the Very Important category. The Not too/ Not at all Important category is probably hard (if not impossible) to reach out to in most parish settings, since these Catholic families probably hardly if ever show up at the parish and do not follow any of our standard modes of communications (i.e., they are not picking up bulletins nor signed up for the parish's Flocknotes). Simply having a conversation with them presents a challenge.

Personal importance of religion when growing up among U.S. adults% of U.S. adults who say when growing up, religion was …

Despite the fact the religion was at least somewhat important at home 89% of the time, 79% of Catholics said it was at least somewhat important to them personally growing up. The 100% increase in the Not too/Not at all Important category can be from a few reasons. First, Christianity is a “religion for adults,” meaning the profound meaning of sin and redemption is understood in greater clarity as an adult. That is not to say children do not understand anything of sin and redemption, but simply to say that the profundity of Christianity often does not become clear until later in life. As a result, we should expect to see some ambiguity of the importance of Christianity to a child.

The next reason is that for many (most?) children Catholicism is simply going to Mass and/or religious education. The celebration of Mass is at times unfortunately not the most inspiring it could be in places and religious education programs often do not have sufficient funding nor staffing (both paid and volunteer) to provide a compelling experience. And in both cases I do not mean that we need more “children's liturgies” which entertain children nor more “relevant” religious education programming (through in some cases either may be helpful). Instead, I simply mean that from the perspective of a child, they can at times struggle to see their place within the religious environment of our parishes.

Nevertheless, a strong majority of American Catholics did see at least some importance in religion as a child. It would seem beneficial to target the Somewhat Important category since these are most likely already in some form of religious education, and so we are literally able to talk and work with them. Finding ways to show how the Gospel answers the questions of life that they have as children and handing on a Catholic worldview is important here.

Effect of Frequency of Participation in Religious Services

“People who grew up attending religious services regularly (at least once a month) are more than twice as likely as those who didn't grow up attending services regularly to say they now attend religious services at least monthly.” (Report, emphasis in original) This is the elephant in the room of parish praxis. Regular religious attendance as defined by the study is certainly laxer than our expectation of weekly attendance; yet from common pastoral experience seeing a family at Mass at least once a month certainly does make them “regular” compared to many of our other families in the parish. Nevertheless, the fact that merely going to Mass⁵ once a month as a child doubles the rate at which they attend Mass as an adult is important. And yet few parishes have any requirement for Mass attendance for their families in religious education (though this is certainly changing in many locations). Based upon this statistical relationship alone, expecting families to go to Mass at least once a month outside of Christmas and Easter (for a grand total of fourteen times a year) could have a marked effect upon our retention rate.

Here it is important to recall our note on causation and correlation at the start of this essay. It is reasonable to suppose that part of the causal effect of this relationship is that families that go to Mass at least once a month (without being incentivized) also take religion more seriously, and families taking religion seriously is the single largest determining fact of a child continuing in their religion as we saw above. If we incentivize families to go to Mass more frequently that may weaken the correlation between regular Mass attendance and future Mass attendance. Conversely by requiring regular Mass attendance that may indicate to the child (and families as a whole) that this is something important and so this statistic may hold.

Continuing, this increase of future participation in one’s religion only increases with the frequency of Mass attendance. “74% of people who were raised in a religion and grew up attending weekly religious services in a family in which religion was very important still identify with their childhood religion today.” (Report) This is on the one hand unsurprising. This correlation is combining the two primary indicators of future participation in religion (importance of religion at home growing up and regular attendance in religious services), and found a stronger correlation than either by themselves. But on the other hand, compare this to what we saw earlier “28% of those raised in highly religious homes are, today, highly religious themselves.” (Report) These are not one-to-one comparisons, but clearly, weekly Mass attendance has an important effect upon long term retention which is greater than monthly attendance.

Conversely “among people who were raised in a religion but grew up seldom or never attending religious services – and in a family in which religion was not too important or not at all important – fewer than half still identify with their childhood religion. Instead, most now say they have no religion (40%) or identify with a religion different from the one in which they were raised (16%).” (Report) And this is what we would expect to find.

Effect of Participation in Religious Education Programs

The report unfortunately does not analyze the long-term effects of religious education upon religious identification as an adult. Instead, the report uses religious education to classify how religious a person's upbringing was. The more years of religious education the more religious the upbring was. And so, we can get an intuitive feeling from the statistics above for the effect of religious education. The more religious education a child received, the more important religion was as a child, and so therefore the more likely the child is to persist in the faith. This relationship then is multiplied by participation in Mass as already noted.

Going beyond the report⁶ in this article we will limit ourselves to simply noting the below statistic for participation of Catholics in religious education:

Attended Sunday school, CCD, or some other form of religious education for…

The “1-3 Years” category would clearly map to those families who are only in religious education to receive the sacraments. “7+ Years” would be the children who completed an entire religious education program starting in first grade all the way through confirmation. The “4-6 Years” group are those children that all Parish Catechetical Leaders know quite well as they figure out how to “catch” these kids up and fit them into their religious education program. The “Did not attend” category is interesting because this is the plurality of Catholic children. Certainly, a majority of our children (63%) receive some religious education, but the fact that over a third receive none presents acute challenges in handing on the faith to the next generations and we should expect less than half of them to identify as Catholic as adults.

Conclusions

The general trends of the study present a challenging future for the Church in America despite the relative stability that we have “enjoyed” for the past decade. Immigrants have provided a stable population floor in the face of the Church hemorrhaging “native-born” Catholics. Troubling thought those same immigrates lose the faith as quickly as everyone else once they are established in America and so we still face the demographic cliff, it is just uncertain how many years we have before it arrives.

In the face of this we largely do not need to convince people of spiritual realities, people are not atheists (properly speaking). America is still quite religious; she is just abandoning institutional religions. This means that when we go out to engage with society our task is not to convince them to have a theological world view, but instead our task is to present the Catholic world view as one which can best give meaning to what they already believe.

Among those who are Catholic, the practice of religion in the family is the most important determinate for long-term retention of the current generation. The most important way that a family practices religion is regular attendance in religious services. Yes, religious education contributed, and it is uncertain why the report did not look at its long-term effects. However, it is clear that even basic (monthly) Mass attendance has a profound effect on long-term religious practice.

This is not a simple call to get “butts” in pews, we have enough experience to know that such an approach does not work when separated from other initiatives. Presumably, the cause of higher retention rates is a combination of Mass itself with the intentionality motivating Mass attendance. Nevertheless, even if regular Mass attendance is not sufficient for long-term retention, the report is further proof for what we have always known, that regular Mass attendance is necessary (though not sufficient). Unfortunately for too many places, when we are honest in how we present our religious education programs, Mass is not necessary. Rarely is a child not advanced through religious education based upon Mass attendance. Rarely is a child not confirmed because of Mass attendance. When push comes to shove, our policy implementations say, “Mass is not necessary.” This point requires deep reflection.

Finally, a point we have not mentioned thus far is the role of wonder at creation and an experience of transcendence in a person’s life. Both are identified by the report as key criteria for those whose spirituality has increased. “The survey finds that Americans who say their spirituality has increased are more likely than other adults (especially those who say their spirituality has declined) to say they regularly feel awe at nature’s beauty, feel a sense of spiritual peace, and experience the presence of something from beyond this world.” (Report, emphasis added) Many (for example Hans Urs Von Balthasar, Pope Benedict XVI, and Bishop Robert Barron) have spoken much about beauty and its role in the “New Evangelization.” They knew intuitively what this study has found empirically: beauty causes wonder which leads to transcendence which opens us to the divine.

Creation is the first revelation of God. It is the means by which the Lord first encountered humanity. The beauty of creation separates us from the manufactured environment to which we have become so accustomed. Creation opens us to a reality before ourselves, beyond our products and control. It leads us to transcendence, to the recognition of something beyond ourselves, which in turn makes space for God to speak to us.

This importance of wonder and transcendence connects to the Catholic religion in a keyway: the Liturgy. The Liturgy mediates the reentrance of the Paschal Mystery from eternity into our finite existence in the here and now. Through the sacred signs and rites creation literally opens into the eternity of Christ. It is essentially transcendent and ought to inspire wonder. And yet, when we survey our liturgical environments and celebrations, how many inspire wonder or help facilitate the experience of transcendence? The Eucharist is the “source and summit of the Christian Life.”⁷ Summits are heights that draw our gaze upwards and inspire wonder. To mount them requires transcendence, meaning moving beyond our present place in life. As we move to call all to Christ every more fully, as we strive to hand on our religion more successfully to the future generation, how can we place the Eucharist more clearly as the summit to which we strive? For this summit is the light shining in the darkness inspiring wonder as we draw close to our Lord who has come so close to us.

Footnotes

“What is truth?” (Jn 18:38) These words of Pilate have rung across the ages. Though he found no guilt in Christ (a truth claim), he nevertheless would hand Christ over to death. The Jewish authorities for their part condemned Christ because from their perspective he had blasphemed and so merited death. From the Christian perspective, while asserting Christ’s innocence, we will quote Christ himself who said “no one takes it [his life] from me, but I lay it down on my own. I have power to lay it down, and power to take it up again.” (Jn 10:18) And so, what is the truth of Christ’s condemnation?

The ambiguities of “truth” as seen in the passion arise often when truth itself is considered. Today we discuss and debate constantly what is “true.” We all (for the most part) agree that there is such a thing as truth; however, rarely do we ever stop to consider what do we mean by that term or by what means we arrive at truth. The past few centuries have provided different answers to both of these questions and often the common person unreflectively mixes them together creating a cacophony of principles for understanding what is true.

This cacophonous path to truth in turn makes it difficult (nigh impossible) to have a true dialogue with another, since if truth is unique to each person and/or there is no common way to arrive at truth, then how can we have any certainty that what we say to another is understood by the other? If there is no common measure to gauge our advancement towards truth, then how can we have any hope that we are advancing in our dialogue with one another (let alone that such an endeavor is even possible)? Given the great importance of “truth,” it is worth reflecting upon it so as to seek greater clarity in what we mean by the concept.

Definition of Truth

Aquinas defines truth as “the conformity of intellect and thing.”¹ The intellect is the power or ability of the soul to apprehend or recognize truth. Aquinas continues stating that “the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object understood.”² And so when the intellect “knows” truth, it is knowing the thing or object³ that it is seeking to understand by way of conforming itself to the object itself. Therefore, we have truth in the intellect only insofar as the notion of the object in our intellect corresponds with the object of our attention.

Continuing, we can say that truth properly speaking exists in the intellect not in the thing itself.⁴ Truth is the impression of the thing upon the intellect, and so the impression “exists” in the intellect. The thing itself is just existing. What we call truth is the impression of that thing in the intellect and we say this impression is true insofar as it corresponds with the thing itself. This then defines a relationship with the thing by which we can say that the thing is true in a secondary sense.⁵

This relationship then serves as a measure of the intellect, since though truth resides in the intellect, it is the existence or being of the object which judges or measures the intellectual impression. And so, truth is essentially relational. Truth depends upon the relationship between the conformity of the knower to that which is known.

Perspectives on Being

This relational aspect of truth brings us to the role of the perspective of the knower. Our perspective affects what we see. Imagine a soda can upon a table. If you look at it straight on, you will perceive the outline of a rectangle with some idea that it is a 3-d object with a curved surface. From this perspective it is true to say that the can has the outline of a rectangle. Now if you change your perspective to be directly above the can looking down, that outline changes to a circle. From this perspective it is true that the outline of the can is a circle. Both perceptions are true, but according to different perspectives. Our perspective (literal and metaphorical) of an object does not change truth but instead changes the kinds of truths that we can apprehend. Changes in perspective reveal more about a thing and so enable the intellect to know more perfectly or fully the object in itself.

Now it must be said that at times a change in perspective does lead us to invalidate previous understandings of an object. This can stem from several sources. First and most simply, we may have had a false impression to begin with. We had not properly conformed our minds to the truth and at a later time have become aware of this fact. Next, we may have had a true impression of the object but then joined (implicitly or explicitly) other false conceptions to that impression. This can often come either from past experiences or imagined connections. The error here is in the added concept, not the initial true impression. Third, our impression of the object was incomplete and resulted in an admixture of truth and falsity.

Returning to the soda can, our perspective upon it really does change how we see the can and so changes the truth about it which we ascertain. Modern psychology and neurology have found that what we attend to (that is focus upon) actually changes what we see in the world. There are more stimuli at any given moment than we can possibly focus upon, and so our act of attending to the world determines how our brain processes sense stimuli (and what it ignores). This act of attending causes us to be unaware or unperceptive of things unrelated to what we are focusing on. If you were to focus upon the soda can attentively and nothing else, someone could walk into the room and so long as they did not disrupt you, you would probably have no idea of their presence. You would be unable to know of them because your attention (that is perspective) restricted what you were able to know.

This connects neatly with a medieval epistemological axiom: quidquid recipitur ad modum recipientis recipitur. (An object is received according to the mode of the recipient receiving it.) Or to quote Aquinas, “the known must be in the knower after the manner of the knower.”⁶ Both of these mean that we know objects according to our mode/way/ability to know them. Our mode of attending to an object modifies our mode of receiving that object at a neurological level. This in turn affects the way in which we know it. And by “way” we mean both the path by which we come to know the object, and the final result of truth in our intellect which has been conditioned by that path.

But this mode of receiving the object into the intellect is not only a matter of attention. It comes into play along the whole sensory path. Our different senses apprehend objects according to their construction and so in turn hand on a sense impression according to that construction. The sound of a trumpet interacts with the ear in a different way than the light reflecting off the trumpet interacts with the eyes. The one and the same object is apprehended by the receiver (eye or ear) according to its mode of being. Further the intellect can only attend to the object according to its available powers. Meaning, a person without sight cannot attend to a trumpet by way of their eyes.

Emotions (or the passions in Thomistic language) are the internal psychosomatic response to external stimuli.⁷ As all know from experience, our emotions “color” or affect how we receive the world and so in turn cause us to know an object according to how we are feeling. Our emotions do not change the truth (unless our emotions change the object itself which we are apprehending⁸) but they do change how we receive it.

As with emotion so too with our internal senses.⁹ We will look at two in particular: memory, and imagination. Memory is the faculty to store sense impressions for recollection at a later time once the sensation has ceased. We can judge our memories as true insofar as in the present they conform to the object which was perceived in the past. This adds a temporal relationship to remembered truth. Our history both as an individual and with the object of perception as remembered conditions the mode by which we experience something and in turn our ability to apprehend a true impression of it. A false impression of some object in the past preconditions us to draw a false impression in the present. So too a memory which was true but has become false over time harms our ability to understand a thing in the moment.

Alongside memory there is imagination, which is the faculty that combines memories together into a phantasm. These phantasms can be said to be true in a restricted way. We can use our imagination to generate diverse ideas on how to do something or what some reality would be like but which we have not experienced ourselves. And so, for such phantasms there is a theoretical reality to judge it by, even though we have not experienced it yet. That phantasm is true insofar as it aligns with reality, but since we have not experienced that reality, we are not justified in calling it true yet. Once we experience the reality itself, then that unjustified true phantasm turns into justified true knowledge. For example, one could imagine a recipe to bake a cake. That recipe could truly make a good cake, but until the cake is actually baked, that judgement is not justified.

Origins of Being

What has been said thus far largely applies to the knower, which is only part of the relationship of truth. If a thing is known according to the mode of the being of the knower, and the intellect conforms itself to the thing, then understanding the nature of the being of the thing itself is quite relevant to understanding what truth is.

And so, we start with two simple observations: things have being (that is things exist), and we encounter their being. Therefore “everything, in as far as it has being, so far is it knowable.”¹⁰ Since, if something does not exist, then there is nothing to know. This is different from knowing an absence of something, since we only know that there is an absence because previously, we had encountered something that had existed and now we no longer encounter that thing. The existence of this absence is predicated or depends upon the previous existence of the thing. For example, you can only know that an object is missing from your pocket if you know the object was previously in your pocket.

To reiterate Aquinas from above, insofar as a thing is, it is knowable. The next question then is: what is a thing? Or to put it another way, whence comes that things being? After all, the origin of a thing in some way makes the thing what it is. Further, that which receives its being from another participates in some way in the other’s being.¹¹ As such, to understand the thing is to in some way know that which gives being or existence to the thing.

Now God alone does not have being, he is being itself.¹² Everything else that exists receives its being from another, ultimately flowing from God since nothing besides God is existence itself.¹³ And it is through things receiving their existence from God that we can come to know God to some degree through knowing things.¹⁴ But this simply knowing that a thing is and that it receives existence from another since it is not its own existence does not exhaust our knowledge of truth. As we encounter being, we find that things exist in multiple ways.

Now since things receive their existence from another and exist in diverse manners, this diversity flows from the design of that which gave the things of the world their existence. And so that which gives being to a thing defines in some way what the thing is. That is, the creator of the thing defines what the thing is. For example, an expo marker is an expo marker because the inventor of the expo marker designed it as such. The marker does not choose to be the marker but instead receives its existence from its creator which makes it what it is. As with the marker, so too with everything else. All that exists receives its being from another. And so, all that is receives what it is from that which created it, ultimately stemming from God.

The truth of what a thing is, then is determined by that which made it or that which is the source of its being.¹⁵ This means that foundationally truth is gift. It is not constructed, it is not acquired, it is not conquered. Before a thing existed, it could do nothing to earn its existence, it could do nothing to determine its existence. It simply received its being as a free gift. And as its being is a gift so too the truth of its being is a gift. In turn, our knowledge of a thing and apprehension of the truth of the thing is a gift revealed to us by the thing which we actively receive.

Unicity of Truth

The nature of existence which we just discussed then indicates that all truth is united. Meaning a) there is a singular source of truth, and b) truths cannot contradict one another. Starting with proposition a, we can imagine how the world would change if there were multiple sources of truth. (This is the same as saying, what if there were multiple creator deities.) If this were the case, we would expect there to be inconsistencies in observed truths since two minds cannot, even when striving to cooperate, coincide exactly. For if they did, then there would be no difference between them, meaning that which was posited as “two minds” would in reality be one mind.¹⁶ As a result, if there were two sources of truth (that is two sources of being) we would expect to find modes of existence that were impossible to rationally reconcile.

But we find that the world is in fact rational and comprehensible. And so, there is one source of truth. This consistency and so unicity of truth derives from the source of all existence being God. He is the single cause and God willed from his divine mind that which is to exist. God himself is simple and one (in nature), and so truth unites in God’s mind.¹⁷

This brings us to proposition b: could different truths contradict each other? Truth is the apprehension of being by the intellect. In order for truths to contradict, the underlying being must contradict. Meaning, a thing must both be and not be in the same way and at the same time. (E.g., a light is simultaneously entirely on and entirely off.) That would violate the law of non-contradiction. To quote Aquinas, “wherefore the first indemonstrable principle is that the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time, which is based on the notion of being and not-being: and on this principle all others are based.”¹⁸ If this principle does not hold, then rational explanations of the world would not be possible.

But this only addresses the existence of the thing in itself. As we come to apprehend something, apparent contradictions between perceived truths do arise at times. The source of these contradictions though is not within the being of the thing, but within the fallible intellect of the knower. When two intellectual apprehensions contradict each other within our mind, that is a sign that we are currently in ignorance of the thing in some way and so need to attend anew to the thing so as to overcome our error and arrive at the truth of the matter more fully.

Stability of Truth

Should one accept that truths are related, and truth is the apprehension of being, they might further wonder if truth claims persist beyond the moment; that is, if something is true, will it be true across some time scale if not across time itself.

In order for truth to change, the being of a thing must change. The degree to which that thing changes determines the degree to which the truth of that thing changes. Now, that which is produced and then exists distinctly from its producer maintains its being unless it itself is modified. It does not change if its producer changes since its existence is independent of the producer. For example, a particular Honda Civic would not cease to be a Civic even if Honda went out of business. However, the truth of the color of that Civic would change if the owner of the car had the car repainted.

That which has existence that depends upon another though changes when that upon which it depends changes. For example, an infant in the womb depends upon its mother. When the health of the mother changes, so too does the health of the infant. Since the being of the dependent thing comes from another, should the being of the other change so too would the being of the dependent thing. Just as if you could shake the trunk of a tree, all the branches, leaves, and animals in the tree would also be shook.

This is the nature of a contingent being. Since they need not exist, their existence is dependent upon that which brought them into existence and so are liable to change. Such change then changes the truth of that thing. With the introduction of change then brings about the “creation” of time. That which is a true statement at one point in time remains true at that point from all future points of time. This is called Historical Truth. However, once there is a change, and so a step forward in time, there is also a corresponding change in truth. This is called Present Truth. Within this progression of time, and so progression of change, we also recognize that there is an underlying unity within things across time (from the Historical Truth into the Present Truth). That is, we recognize that there is an identity which persists across changes. And so, there is some mode of being (and truth) that persists through the changes that advance time forward.

This is what we will call substance, or form, or nature.¹⁹ If something changes so much that it has a new substance, or form, or nature, then what the thing is, has changed. Further, so long as forms and natures themselves remain stable across time, then truths pertaining to forms and natures from the past are still valid in the present. And here our earlier discussion on the Origins of Being flowing from God is once more relevant. Natures and forms come from the mind of God.²⁰ So long as God does not change his mind and so redefine what a particular nature is (e.g., he does not decide in 2050 A.D. to change what it means to be human), then natures and forms themselves do not change. Now, God himself is pure act and so does not change,²¹ and so his knowledge does not change.²² Further, God’s will does not change and so he will not redefine that which already is.²³ And so forms and natures flowing from the divine mind are themselves stable.

Beyond the contingent truths which we have been discussing, there are another class of truths called necessary truths. There are things which simply must exist the way that they do and are unchanging. Mathematical truths, for example, are necessary. And so, the idea one plus another one must result in two. Such truths are by their essence atemporal since they cannot change by definition. These truths when apprehended within time are then known to be true across all points of time necessarily. The ground of stability for necessary truths resides within the mind of God just as in aspects of contingent truths.

And it is here upon the stability of truth where I will finish this reflection. At a later time, I will look more deeply into the origins of being since the relationship between the divine mind and being is of essential importance to the whole epistemological framework I have just outlined. Further, the question of error needs to be addressed since it leads us to further understand the relationship between the intellect and the thing. Finally, we must reflect upon the nature of mystery and wonder in relation to Truth, since truth ultimately ascends to God who transcends the created intellect.

Footnotes

I typed up my commentary notes and formatted them into a little book. You can download the notes here: notes. I need to finish editing the notes, and add commentary on the final chapter of Mark, on Christ’s resurrection, but you can view the current notes at the above link.

It can be purchased from Lulu Express here, and a PDF of the complete log can be downloaded here. The log contains 2500 individual entries and costs $12.12 (excluding shipping). I receive no money from a purchase, it is sold at cost.

You can read my conferences and homily here. I compiled them together into a single pdf for easy of reading. They are my notes to preach from, with some editorial corrections. As naturally occurs though, those who were present received a conference which does not match the notes one hundred percent.

The conferences and Mass were recorded. You can watch the three conferences and the closing Mass at the links below:

• Conference 1: July 13, 2023
• Conference 2: July 14, 2024
• Conference 3: July 15, 2024
• Mass: July 16, 2023

Update:
This article was originally entitled: Question: When a Solemnity during Lent falls on a Saturday, does the celebration of the Solemnity which begins on the preceding evening dispense one from the obligation of abstinence during the evening of the Friday of Lent? It was prompted by the Solemnity of Saint Joseph (March 19^th) which fell on a Saturday during Lent of 2022. I missed a helpful rubric in the Universal Norms On The Liturgical Year And The General Roman Calendar in the original article which makes the matter even more clear. This updated article then is provided to be clearer upon the matter.

Introduction¹

The question this article seeks to address is: when a Solemnity during Lent falls on a Saturday, does the celebration of the Solemnity, which begins on the preceding evening, dispense one from the obligation of abstinence during the evening of the Friday of Lent? In brief the answer is no, the celebration of a Solemnity beginning on a Friday evening in Lent, does not lift the Friday obligation of abstinence. In order to answer this question more fully we need to first understand what a day is according to canon law. Then we need to understand what the norms regulating Fridays in Lent are. Finally, we must look at when the day of a Solemnity begins and how it relates to these first two parts.

1. Canonical Definition of Time

There are three canons which are relevant for our question:

Canon 200. Unless the law expressly provides otherwise, time is to be computed according to the norm of the following canons.

Canon 201. §1. Continuous time is understood as that which undergoes no interruption.

Canon 202. §1. In law, a day is understood as a period consisting of 24 continuous hours and begins at midnight unless other provision is expressly made.

These canons are straight forward. A day is defined as above unless explicitly defined otherwise. Also, a day is a continuous period unless something explicitly interrupts this period. So, this tells us what a day is. With this definition we can look at the law governing the particular day: Friday in Lent.

2. Canonical Norms Regulating Fridays in Lent

There are two canons which are relevant for the penitential regulations on Fridays:

Canon 1250. The penitential days and times in the universal Church are every Friday of the whole year and the season of Lent.

Canon 1251. Abstinence from meat, or from some other food as determined by the Episcopal Conference, is to be observed on all Fridays, unless a solemnity should fall on a Friday. Abstinence and fasting are to be observed on Ash Wednesday and Good Friday.

Once more these regulations are straight forward, a Friday in Lent is a penitential day and therefore a) a day beginning at midnight and lasts for twenty-four continuous hours, and so b) this period can only be interrupted by another explicit provision. The only provided provision for the abstinence from meat to be lifted is if a solemnity should fall on a Friday. That is, should the day of a solemnity correspond with a Friday, then the obligation of abstinence is not in force.

In the case which concerns us, the day of the Solemnity does not in fact fall on a Friday, but instead falls on a Saturday. So, the immediate application of the provision provided in canon 1251 does not apply. Therefore, the remaining options for the day of the Solemnity to lift the obligation of abstinence are either:

a) the day of the Solemnity explicitly interrupts the day of Friday, in which case the above canons no longer apply as the day of Friday has finished, or

b) the day of the Solemnity extends beyond the normal canonical day (which per canon 200 must be explicitly stated), in which case the day of Friday and the day of the Solemnity overlap for a period of time. Then there would be a partial correspondence of the day of the Solemnity falling on a Friday and so canon 1251 may apply.

3. Legal Norms Regulating the Definition of the Day of a Solemnity

To begin to explore these two potential cases we must remember that:

Canon 2. For the most part the Code does not define the rites which must be observed in celebrating liturgical actions. Therefore, liturgical laws in force until now retain their force unless one of them is contrary to the canons of the Code.

The answer to what a solemnity is, will not be found in the Code of Canon Law. Instead, we must look to the beginning of the Roman Missal where most of the liturgical law is found. After the General Instruction of the Roman Missal there is the Universal Norms on the Liturgical Year and the General Roman Calendar. These norms define the liturgical year and what constitute different feasts (in the general sense). Paragraph 3 of the Universal Norms defines the Liturgical day as, “The liturgical day runs from midnight to midnight. However, the celebration of Sunday and of Solemnities begins already on the evening of the previous day.” This definition of the liturgical day corresponds perfectly with the definition of the canonical day. It further makes a distinction between the extension of the celebration and the day itself. The extension of the celebration extends beyond that of the day proper.

This immediately eliminates the opportunity for either option (a or b) from above to apply in lifting the obligation of abstinence on Fridays in Lent. The law concerning abstinence is governed by the day, not the celebration during part of the day. Since a liturgical day is explicitly defined to be the same as the canonical day, when the liturgical day is on a Saturday it cannot interrupt the day of the preceding Friday. Further, since the liturgical day is defined in temporal extension separate from the celebration’s temporal extension, the extension of the celebration cannot interrupt the previous day, since there is no provision for anything but a day to do so. Therefore, a Solemnity on a Saturday does not lift the obligation for abstinence on a Friday.²

As a final word, canon 87. §1. gives the Bishop the authority to dispense any or all his subjects from observing a day of penance. Canon 1245 states that “a pastor can grant in individual cases a dispensation from the obligation of […] a day of penance or can grant a commutation of the obligation into other pious works.” Therefore, pastors can dispense in individual cases; however it is laudable to commute the penance into other pious works.

Footnotes

OCF 432-436 indicates the modifications for the reception of the remains in the case when there is no body, but instead cremated remains. The family and remains are still greeted in the usual way. (OCF 432) The cremated remains are then sprinkled with holy water, but with a different accompanying formula. (OCF 433) The procession is modified in the absence of a casket. There is no pall (OCF 434), and the priest and ministers proceed at the front of the procession directly to the altar, without placing a Christian Symbol. (OCF 435) The remains are then placed before the paschal candle like a body would be. (OCF 435) The liturgy then continues as normal. (OCF 436)

Given these indications for the reception of the remains, which retains the sprinkling with holy water, and that OCF 428 indicates that the Final Commendation continues as indicated in the Ritual (OCF 170-175) with the only modification coming at the end of the liturgy in the words of the dismissal, (OCF 437) it is therefore reasonable to incense the cremated remains.

The sprinkling of holy water upon the casket and the incensing of the casket have similar symbolism. The sprinkling at the beginning is “in remembrance of the deceased person’s initiation and first acceptance into the community of faithful.” (OCF 133) Then in the Final Commendation “the body may then be sprinkled with holy water and incense. […] The sprinkling is a reminder that through Baptism the person was marked for eternal life and the incensation signifies respect for the body as the temple of the Holy Spirit.” (OCF 147) Therefore if we are to sprinkle the remains at the beginning, it is also reasonable to incense them at the end.

One might object that the cited paragraphs explicitly reference the body, and the Final Commendation only mentions a coffin. (OCF 173) However as mentioned above OCF 433 clearly states that the cremated remains are to be sprinkled with holy water and OCF 428 states that the ritual for the Final Commendation is to be followed, while making only one modification as previously noted. The apparent discrepancy in language stems from the fact that the ritual was not written with cremation in mind, as is noted in the Decree permitting funeral liturgies for cremated remains. (OCF pg. 417) As such the appendix includes all the adaptations required for a liturgy involving cremated remains. (OCF pg. 417) As noted in OCF 434, the appendix does indicate elements to be removed, while also stating that the liturgy otherwise should be as outlined in the normal rubrics. It says nothing concerning the incensation, and so the normal rubrics are in force. Similarly, the appendix does not provide rubrical glosses for every place the ritual normally says body or coffin, but instead trusts that the ministers will be able to mentally substitute cremated remains and urn when the rubrics provide instructions concerning the body or coffin. And so, the lack of the language cremated remains or urn in the main ritual should not be a cause of concern with regards to the incensation during the Final Commendation.

The last remaining question then is how would the remains be incensed? It is common that the coffin is incensed by walking around it while swinging the thurible. Since the urn is so much smaller, walking around the urn would seem a bit excessive. Instead, the customary three sets of double swings would seem dignified and sufficient.

Footnotes